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PRIVATE CLUBS AND EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: DOES FEDERAL LAW
APPLY?
I.

Introduction

From April 1977 to December 1977, Alfred A. Hudson worked as
a maintenance man for the Charlotte Country Club.' The day after
he was fired from that job, he filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission' (the Commission). Hudson alleged that his termination was racially motivated3 and thus in violation

1. See Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, 535 F. Supp. 313, 314 (W.D.N.C.
1982).
2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission) was created
by title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241, 258 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982)), and became operational July 2,
1965. The Commission has responsibility for enforcing Title VII as well as the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1982)) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The Commission maintains its headquarters in Washington,

D.C., but staffs offices throughout the country. See OFFiCE OF TlE
Tim UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MAUAL 1987/1988, at 528-33.

FEDERAL REGISTER,

In 1984, the most recent year for which an annual report is available, the Commission
received 93,751 charges of racial discrimination of which the greatest number (33,108)
were claims of discharge based on race. The next highest number of complaints based
on race related to terms and conditions of employment (14,579). The total of all
charges for 1984 was 207,542. Most complainants, however, claim a number of areas
of discrimination. For example, Alfred Hudson claimed racial discrimination in both
discharge and terms and conditions of employment. Therefore, the number 207,542
is larger than the number of complainants. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, NINETEENTH ANN. REP. 20 (1984) (available at the Fordham Urban Law
Journal office).
3. See Hudson, 535 F. Supp. at 314. Under Title VII, one of the federal laws
which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission enforces, the term "race" has
caused few problems of interpretation. This clarity stems from Title VII's use of
additional terms, "color" and "national origin," to designate types of persons against
whom one may not discriminate in employment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1982) (making it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin). Thus, Title VII clearly protects American Indians,
Mexican Americans, Hispanics, blacks and whites. See A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DiscRIMINATIoN § 68.00, at 13-9 to -10 (1987) [hereinafter LARSON]. The Commission
has stated that a discriminatory preference for a light-skinned black over a darkskinned black constitutes discrimination based on color. Id. § 68.30, at 13-13. For a
discussion of the definition of race under other federal law, see infra note 12.
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of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).4 In addition,
he alleged that the payment and treatment accorded him while employed
had been less than that provided to white employees, another Title
5
VII violation.
Ordinarily the filing of such a complaint with the Commission would

start a complex administrative procedure.6 In Hudson's case, however,
the Commission lacked jurisdiction.7 Title VII created the Commission
and defined those employers within its jurisdiction.' A bona fide private
membership club is not an employer within the scope of the statute. 9

Hence, the Commission dismissed Hudson's charges for lack of jurisdiction over the Charlotte Country Club.10
Hudson appealed the Commission's decision to a federal court,'

alleging, in addition, a violation of section 1981 of title 42 of the
United States Code (section 198 1),12 which also prohibits employment
4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,
258 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982)). Congress has amended Title VII twice:
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (clarifying
that sex discrimination includes discrimination on basis of pregnancy, childbirth or
related medical conditions); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (making numerous changes including expansion of coverage
to employees of local, state and federal governments).
5. Hudson, 535 F. Supp. at 314. For a list of illegal employment practices under
Title VII, see infra note 22.
6. See infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
7. Hudson, 535 F. Supp. at 314.
8. 42 U.S.C. 99 2000e-4, 2000e(b) (1982).
9. Id. § 2000e(b). For a discussion of what constitutes a bona fide private
membership club, see infra notes 83-109 and accompanying text.
10. Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, 535 F. Supp. 313, 314 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
11. Id. Section 2000e-5(f)(l) of title 42 of the United States Code grants the right
to appeal a Commission decision to a federal court.
12. Section 1981 codifies the rights and duties of all persons in the United States:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every [s]tate and [tierritory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
Defining "race" under § 1981 has proven more problematic than under Title VII.
The Supreme Court has recently settled some of the dispute in Saint Francis College
v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 3244 (1987). Justice White
wrote that "Congress [in 18661 intended to protect from discrimination identifiable
classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of
their ancestry." Id. at 2028. Thus, if the plaintiff in Saint Francis College could show
that he had been denied tenure because he was an Arab, his § 1981 claim would
survive a motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also Shaare Tefila Congregation v.
Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019, 2022 (1987) (Jews are protected by § 1982 because they were
considered distinct race at time Congress originally adopted § 1982).
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discrimination based on race, but does not exempt private clubs from
its requirements.13 The court found the Charlotte Country Club exempt

from the requirements of Title VII and then further held that the
Title VII exemption "supercedes and limits [section] 1981 so as to
bar [an] employment discrimination suit under [section] 1981 as well."

14

Granting summary judgment for the defendant-employer, the court
never reached the merits of Hudson's complaint.
Hudson's case is one of four district court decisions 5 addressing
the problem of employment discrimination by private clubs. These

13. At present, § 1981 reaches private acts of racial discrimination, i.e., there is
no state action requirement. On April 25, 1988, however, the Supreme Court voted
5-to-4 to invite argument over whether that application of § 1981 (as expressed in
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)) should be overruled. See Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988). Oral argument took place on October
12, 1988. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 57 U.S.L.W. 3295 (Oct. 25, 1988).
In Runyon, parents of children excluded from private schools on racial grounds
sued under § 1981. The Supreme Court held that § 1981 covers racial discrimination
in private contracts, such as the one between the schools and the public. Runyon,
427 U.S. at 172-73. Justice Stewart wrote that it was "well established" that § 1981
reaches private acts of discrimination. Id. at 168. The dissent disagreed, stating that
Runyon was the first Supreme Court case to consider the issue. Id. at 192 (White,
J., dissenting).
In Patterson, the Supreme Court originally heard arguments as to whether
§ 1981 reaches racial harassment in the workplace. The decision to hear arguments
on the validity of Runyon "provoked .. . blistering dissenting opinions by Justicels]
Blackmun and Stevens, widespread media coverage, and grave concern among civil
rights advocates concerning the expected longevity of Runyon." Schwartz & Kaufman,
Civil Rights in Jeopardy, N.Y.L.J., May 17, 1988, at 1, col. 1. A decision to overrule
Runyon "would be the first time in modem history, and perhaps ever, that [the
Supreme Court] had overturned a major precedent expanding the rights of racial
minorities." Taylor, Court, 5-4, Votes to Restudy Rights in Minority Suits, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 26, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
Were Runyon overruled, this Note's argument that § 1981 should be viewed as a
separate remedy from Title VII would become moot. Section 1981 would be rendered
"virtually redundant with [other statutes] that bar states from discriminating against
racial minorities in making laws on contracts and other ways." Id. at A24, col. 4.
Were Runyon overruled, this Note's argument that private clubs should not be
exempt from Title VII would become stronger. Without § 1981, private club employees
would not even have the possibility of a remedy for employment discrimination. As
Justice Blackmun noted, "[a]lthough it is probably true that most racial discrimination
in the employment context will continue to be redressable under other statutes [than
§ 1981], it may be that racial discrimination in certain other contexts is not actionable
independently of [§1 1981." Patterson, 108 S.Ct. at 1422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Private clubs are one of those "other contexts."
14. Hudson, 535 F. Supp. at 317.
15. Baptiste v. Cavendish Club, 670 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (former employee
alleged violations of Title VII and § 1981); Guesby v. Kennedy, 580 F. Supp. 1280
(D. Kan. 1984) (black cook alleged she was fired by club on racial grounds); Hudson
v. Charlotte Country Club, 535 F. Supp. 313 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (black maintenance
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courts are divided 1 6 on the issue of whether a private club-exempt
from employment discrimination suits based on race under Title VIIis also exempt under section 1981.17 Two courts held that the Title
VII exemption for private clubs impliedly amended section 1981 so
as to bar an employment discrimination suit against a private club. 8
The other two courts specifically rejected such an implied amendment
of section 1981, viewing section 1981, instead, as the source of a
separate remedy from that provided by Title VII.' 9
Part II of this Note examines the general history and function of
Title VII and section 1981. Part III discusses the problems inherent
in defining an organization as a private club. Part IV examines whether
Title VII impliedly amends section 1981 with respect to the private
club exemption. The arguments for and against finding an implied
amendment of section 1981 focus on rules of statutory construction
and legislative history. The argument for finding an implied amendment stems from a line of cases which holds that a section 1981
plaintiff does not have a cause of action against a private club that
denies him membership. Part V argues that these membership discrimination cases differ radically from employment discrimination cases,
which address entirely different sets of rights. This Note concludes
therefore that courts should consider Title VII and section 1981 as

man alleged his termination was racially motivated and that payment and treatment
accorded him was less than that provided white employees); Kemerer v. Davis, 520
F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (former employee, a white security guard, alleged
that black manager of club fired him on racial grounds and that treatment accorded
him was less than that received by black employees).
16. Kemerer and Hudson held that private clubs exempt under Title VII were also
exempt under § 1981. Guesby and Baptiste held that a § 1981 claim could be maintained
despite the Title VII exemption.
17. The Supreme Court has not reached the issue of whether the Title II, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1982), private club exemption applies in a § 1981 action
(Title II covers access to places of public accommodation and thus cases involving
membership in and not employment by private clubs). On the three occasions when
it might have reached this issue, the Supreme Court found another direction from
which to approach the problem presented. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
172 n. 10 (1976) (private school is neither place of public accommodation nor exempt
private club); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 438-39
(1973) (recreation association that opened membership to all white people within 3/
4 mile area was not genuine private club); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S.
229, 236 (1969) (community pool that permitted membership to all white people within
area was not bona fide private club; nonwhite plaintiff had right to use it). The only
court of appeals presented with the question of whether § 1981 is subject to the
private club defense has refused to pass on the continued validity of that holding.
Wright v. Salisbury Club, 632 F.2d 309, 311 n.5 (4th Cir. 1980).
18. See Hudson, 535 F. Supp. at 317; Kemerer, 520 F. Supp. at 260.
19. See Baptiste, 670 F. Supp. at 110; Guesby, 580 F. Supp. at 1286.
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two separate remedies. Finally, this Note recommends that because
nothing in the legislative history supports the private club exemption
and because club members' right to freedom of association does not
extend to their relationships with club employees, Congress should
repeal that part of Title VII that provides such an exemption.
II.

An Overview of Title VII and Section 1981

2
2°
A brief comparison of the history and regulatory framework 1 of
Title VII and section 1981 sheds light on the potential availability of
each statute to the plaintiff claiming employment discrimination genthat a private
erally, and more specifically, to the plaintiff alleging
22
discrimination.
employment
in
club has engaged

A.

The Purpose of Title VII

Congress enacted title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII) to achieve equality of employment opportunity by eliminating
discrimination based on race.2 3 Other titles of the 1964 Act aim to

20. See infra notes 23-27, 40-53 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 28-39, 54-59 and accompanying text.
22. Title VII defines unlawful discrimination by an employer:
[It shall be unlawful for an employer to] fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise.., discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin; or ... limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).

Title VII also outlines unlawful employment practices by employment agencies, id.
§ 2000e-2(b), labor organizations, id. § 2000e-2(c), and training programs, id. § 2000e2(d). In addition, other requirements of the statute protect employees from reprisals
resulting from their opposition to illegal employer practices or their cooperation in
Commission proceedings. Id. § 2000e-3(a). Finally, Title VII proscribes employment
advertisements that indicate any preference based on race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. Id. § 2000e-3(b).
23. Although racial discrimination was the impetus for the enactment of Title VII,
the statute also prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, national origin or
sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to -2(d) (1982). The House Report on the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, in explaining the reasons for the Act, states the following: "In various
regions of the country there is discrimination against some minority groups. Most
glaring, however, is the discrimination against Negroes which exists throughout our
[niation." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmiN. NEWS 2391, 2393.
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eliminate discrimination in the areas of voting, 24 education 5 and access
to public accommodations. 26 Moreover, Congress intended that all of
7
these protected rights complement each other.
B.

Procedure Under Title VH

Title VII sets up a formal procedure with strict deadlines which all
claimants must follow. 28 After deferral, when appropriate, to a state
or local agency and after investigation of a claim of discrimination ,29

24. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982). Title I of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was intended
to "meet problems encountered in the operation and enforcement of the Civil Rights
Acts of 1957 and 1960, by which the Congress took steps to guarantee to all citizens
the right to vote without discrimination as to race or color." 1964 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMNw. NEWS 2391, 2394. The 1964 Act gave priority to voting rights litigation
and addressed the problem of literacy tests. See id.
25. 42 U.S.C. 99 2000c to 2000c-9 (1982).
26. Id. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6.
27. See, e.g., Additional Views on H.R. 7152 of Hon. William M. McCulloch,
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2487, 2513.
"The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an empty stomach.
The impetus to achieve excellence in education is lacking if gainful employment is
closed to the graduate. The opportunity to enter a restaurant or a hotel is a shallow
victory where one's pockets are empty." Id.
28. Any person who believes he has been discriminated against may file a charge
in writing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission)
within 180 days of the perceived discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982), as
long as the employer is not excluded from the Commission's jurisdiction by the terms
of Title VII. An "employer" is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has [15] or more employees [but not] the United States, a corporation wholly
owned by the [g]overnment of the United States, an Indian tribe, [certain departments
and agencies] of the District of Columbia . . . or a bona fide private membership
club , ..... " Id. § 2000e-(b). The Commission then serves notice of the charge on

the employer within [10] days. Id. § 2000e-5(b). Before investigating the claim, the
Commission refers charges to state or local fair employment practices agencies for 60
days if that state or local government has a relevant fair employment practices law.
Id. § 2000e-5(c). Congress designed this procedure to allow the states "every opportunity
to employ their expertise and experience without premature interference by the [flederal
government." 110 CONG. RnC. 12,725 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
A discrimination complainant cannot bring a Title VII action in a federal court
after a state court has reviewed and affirmed a state administrative agency's unfavorable
decision. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1981) (5-4 decision)
(applying 28 U.S.C. § 1738 which requires federal courts to afford same full faith
and credit to state court judgments that would apply in state's own court).
29. See supra note 22 for a listing of discriminatory practices under Title VII.
The deferral to a state or local agency is provided for by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)
(1982). It reads as follows:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a
[sitate, or political subdivision of a [sitate, which has a [s]tate or local law
prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or
authorizing a [sitate or local authority to grant or seek relief from such
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the Commission ° determines whether there is reasonable cause to believe
the employee's charges. 1 If it finds cause, the Commission initially
attempts to remedy the alleged unlawful practice through "conference,
conciliation and persuasion.' '32 If the Commission is unable to secure
a conciliation agreement that it finds acceptable, it has the power to
bring a civil action. 3 If the Commission chooses not to sue, the

complainant may sue independently. 4 In addition, the Commission may
initiate suits or may intervene in civil actions brought by private parties.35
To encourage complainants to seek a remedy under Title VII,
Congress attempted to simplify the complaint process. A complainant
may begin the process without the assistance of counsel. Alternatively,
Title VII provides for the appointment of an attorney for the
complainant and for a waiver of fees or other court costs. 36 A court

' 3 7 Pomay order "such affirmative action as may be appropriate.
tential remedies include reinstatement, hiring or up to two years of
back pay.3 8 Neither compensatory nor punitive damages are available
39
in a Title VII action.

practice ... no charge may be filed [with the Commission] ... before
the expiration of [60] days after proceedings have been commenced under
the [s]tate or local law.
Id.
30. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the Commission.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517
F.2d 826, 868 (5th Cir. 1975) (Commission has "broad discretion" to determine which
suits it will bring and which it will leave to private plaintiffs), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). The complainant must file his civil action
within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Commission. A party may
demand such a letter from the Commission 180 days after the charge was first filed.
Id.
35. Id. § 2000e-6(a). The statute originally provided that where there was a pattern
or practice of discrimination, the Attorney General could bring a suit on his own
initiative. See United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 379 (E.D. La. 1969) (Attorney
General properly instituted suit against restaurant that had become "club" in order
to exclude blacks); see also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 268-69 (White, J.,
dissenting) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000b(a), a similar provision to § 20000e-6(a)).
With respect to discrimination by private employers, the right to bring suit was
transferred to the Commission in 1972. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (1982). The Attorney
General still has the right to initiate litigation with respect to discrimination by state
or local governments or political subdivisions. See Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978,
§ 5, 92 Stat. 3781 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982)).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982).
37. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., White v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 692 F.2d 1286, 1290
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C. History of Section 1981
Section 198140 originated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.41 Congress
enacted the 1866 Act during the post-Civil War Reconstruction
period 42 to protect the rights of the newly-freed slaves. 43 The law
was later reenacted as a part of the Enforcement Act of 1870. 44
Because courts interpreted the statute restrictively, before 1968
very few plaintiffs brought suit under section 1981 . 4 1 In that year,

(9th Cir. 1982) (punitive damages are not recoverable under Title VII); Robinson v.
City of Lake Station, 630 F. Supp. 1052, 1064 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (damages for pain
and suffering are compensatory and not recoverable under Title VII).
40. See supra note 12 for the text of § 1981.
41. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. Section 1 of the Act contains the
following:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, [t]hat all persons born in the
United States ...

are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States;

and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same
right, in every [s]tate and [tierritory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. § 1 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)).
42. Reconstruction refers to the era following the Civil War when the former
Confederate states were closely controlled by the federal government. See generally
J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, TBE CivIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1969).
43. From late 1865 through early 1866, the Southern states passed laws referred
to as the Black Codes. H. BELZ, EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS 113-14 (1978).
The Codes represented an attempt to keep the former slaves in an inferior position
"by restricting their access to ordinary civil rights and liberties that white persons
enjoyed." Id. at 114. The Black Codes proscribed ownership of arms by blacks and
criminalized the act of educating former slaves. See Comment, Developments in the
Law-Section 1981, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 29, 40 n.37 (1980) [hereinafter
Section 1981].
44. See HON. C. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMNATION LAW AND
CIvIL RIHTs ACTIONS IN THm FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS DI-I (1985). The Act of
May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 144 reads as follows: "And be it further enacted,
[tihat the act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and
furnish the means of their vindication, passed April nine, eighteen hundred and sixtysix, is hereby reenacted ....

"

See also Section 1981, supra note 43, at 36.

45. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948) (§ 1982 focuses on governmental
action and "does not invalidate private restrictive agreements"). In Corrigan v.
Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926), Corrigan, the white defendant, covenanted not
to sell her property to a black buyer but later contracted to do so. The Supreme
Court in Corrigan held that legislation enacted to enforce the thirteenth amendment
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however, the Supreme Court interpreted a related statute, 46 section
1982 of title 42 of the United States Code (section 1982), 47 as reaching
private discrimination in the sale of rental property. In Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. ,4 Justice Stewart wrote that the congressional
intent behind section 1982 was "to prohibit all racially motivated
deprivations of the rights enumerated in the [Civil Rights Act of
149
1866].'
Immediately following Jones, courts refused to apply section 1981

to private actions-despite Jones' determination that section 1982
applied to private actions.50 These courts reasoned that sections 1981

only protects blacks against slavery and "does not in other matters protect the
rights of persons of the negro race." Id. at 330; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 17 (1883) ("civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution ... cannot
be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by [s]tate authority
.... [Such an act by an individual] is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that
individual"); see also Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906) (legislation
enacted to enforce thirteenth amendment can only punish conduct that actually
enslaves someone), overruled in pertinent part, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968).
46. Sections 1981 and 1982 both derive from the original 1866 statute. See
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976). For the texts of §§ 1981 and 1982
and the original statute, see supra note 12, infra note 47 and supra note 41,
respectively.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982) provides the following: "All citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every [sitate and [tierritory, as is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property."
48. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
49. Id. at 426. Justice Stewart reasoned that because § 2 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 provided criminal penalties for anyone who deprived another, "under
color of law," of the rights enumerated in the statute, § 1, which did not use the
language "under color of law," must apply to all-public and private-discriminatory deprivations of rights. See id. at 424-26.
Justice Stewart stated that Congress' power to enact § 1982 derived from the
thirteenth amendment. Id. at 439. The thirteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution states as follows: "Section 1: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude
... shall exist within the United States. Section 2: Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
When Congress reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 through the Enforcement
Act of 1870, the words "all persons born in the United States" became "all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States" in what is now § 1981. See supra
notes 12, 41. Similar language, however, in § 1982 stayed the same. See supra

notes 41, 47. Because the fourteenth amendment, but not the thirteenth distinguishes
citizens from noncitizens, some believe that § 1981 enforces the former rather than

the latter. See Section 1981, supra note 43, at 36. Others disagree. See Cornelius

v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1197 n.25 (D. Conn.
1974).
50. See Harrison v. American Can Co., 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1 (S.D.
Ala. 1969) (§ 1981 not intended to reach private conduct; nor does § 1981's
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and 1982 were two separate statutes covering different areas of
discrimination." Subsequently, several appellate courts read Jones
to hold that if section 1982 reached all racial discrimination, section
1981 must also reach such discrimination-including racial discrimination in private employment. 2 The Supreme Court later affirmed
this position in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency. 3
D.

Procedure Under Section 1981

While section 1981 clearly prohibits racial discrimination, the statute does not provide for methods of enforcement.14 Therefore, courts
language, "to make and enforce contracts," plainly apply to employment discrimination charges).
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988), the Supreme
Court will reconsider whether § 1981 should apply to private acts of racial discrimination. See supra note 13 for a discussion of the McLean case. Another recent
case illustrating the continuing controversy over the scope of § 1981 is Bhandari
v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc). There,
the Fifth Circuit held that § 1981 permits drawing distinctions between citizens and
aliens, i.e., that it is acceptable to discriminate against a party (here, a plaintiff
seeking credit) on the basis of his noncitizen status. Id. at 1345. The opinion,
foreshadowing the McLean case, noted that three present members of the Supreme
Court believe § 1981 should not reach private racial discrimination. Id. at 1351
(three members noted were Justices Stevens, White and then Justice Rehnquist).
In Bhandari, Judge Gee stated that he believes § 1981 "directs [sitates and [tierritories
to grant each and every group of humans, no matter how defined or classified,
the same rights in their courts and under their laws as they grant white citizensno more, no less." Id. at 1345; see also McClain, The Chinese Struggle for Civil
Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CAu. L.
REv. 529, 530 (1984) (legislative history shows § 1981 was not intended "to promote
the civil rights of the nation's newly emancipated black citizens, but rather to
respond to the plight of another aggrieved racial minority-the Chinese of California").
51. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 192-214 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)
(discussing the legislative history of § 1981 and concluding that the construction
of § 1982 in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. does not require that § 1981 be
construed in a similar manner). But see Runyon, 427 U.S. at 190 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("incongruous to give those two sections a fundamentally different
construction").
52. See, e.g., Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1974) ("[i]t
is settled that [§]1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private employment");
Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621, 623 (8th Cir. 1972) (court follows
reasoning of Jones decision); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044,
1046 (5th Cir. 1971) (court assumes § 1981 covers private employment for purposes
of plaintiff's complaint), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972).
53. 421 U.S. 454, 459-69 (1975). But see supra note 13 for a discussion of
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, where on April 25, 1988, the Supreme Court
requested reargument on the issue of whether § 1981 should apply to private acts
of racial discrimination.
54. See supra note 12 for the text of § 1981.
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themselves have evolved procedures for applying the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (the Act). 5 For example, section 1981 does not specify
a statute of limitations.1 6 Courts thus import the relevant state statute
of limitations from the jurisdiction in which the complaint was
filed.5 7 Similarly, section 1981 does not specify what remedies are
available to a plaintiff suing under its provisions. 8 Courts have held
that a section 1981 plaintiff may seek compensatory and punitive
damages, as well as those remedies available to a Title VII plaintiff. 9
E. Title VII and Section 1981: Relative Advantages and
Disadvantages
Two federal private remedies are available to a person who has
60
been the victim of employment discrimination on the basis of race.
First, one can begin the administrative proceedings provided for

under Title

VII.61

In addition, one can bring suit under section

1981.62

1.

Title VII

Title VII aims to prohibit all acts of employment discrimination
based on race63 and national origin. 64 Therefore, for a Title VII
55. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 12 for the text of § 1981.
57. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 2620-21 (1987) (state

statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to claims arising under
§ 1981).
58. See supra note 12 for the text of § 1981.
59. See Rowlett v. Anheuser Busch, 832 F.2d 194, 206-07 (1st Cir. 1987)
(§ 1981 plaintiff will receive $300,000 in punitive damages rather than $3 million

awarded by jury); White v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Co., 692 F.2d 1286,
1290 (9th Cir. 1982) (punitive damages available under § 1981); Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 554 F.2d 876, 883 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
891 (1977). For the Title VII remedies, see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying
text.
60. A plaintiff also has state and lqcal remedies. See, e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAW
§§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982). Section 292(9) excludes "any institution, club or place
of accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private" from the definition of
a place of public accommodation for purposes of the statute. Id. § 292(9). Section
292(5), however, defines an employer as anyone with four or more employees,
failing to exempt private clubs. Id. § 292(5).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
62. Id.§ 1981.
63. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). See supra note 3 for a discussion of the meaning of
"race" under Title VII.

64. Id.; see also supra note 23. The Fifth Circuit has recently held that § 1981
does not extend to discrimination based on citizenship. See supra note 50. The
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plaintiff, initial determinations as to whether discrimination is "racial" are not likely to be necessary.
In addition, whereas Title VII covers practices neutral on their
face, that adversely impact one race over another, section 1981 does
not cover such practices-rather, it requires that the discrimination
be purposeful.

65

Further, unlike section 1981, Title VII includes specific provisions
that facilitate enforcement of the Act's policies. For example, both
the Attorney General and the Commission may bring suit to require
compliance with Title VII. 66 Moreover, Title VII is set up so that
a complainant may proceed without counsel. If the complainant
chooses to retain counsel, however, the Act provides for payment
of attorney's fees. 67 Because the process of settling a complaint under
Title VII is conciliatory rather than adversarial, a Title VII plaintiff
is not precluded from seeking such remedies as reinstatement or
68
hiring.
2.

Section 1981

By contrast, section 1981 does not provide specific procedural
guidelines and thus access to the courts is gained more quickly for
a section 1981 plaintiff. 69 In addition, the statute of limitations in
a section 1981 action is longer than the length of time a Title VII

complainant has to file charges of discrimination with the Com-

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, however, believes that Title VII covers
such discrimination when the practice has the purpose or effect of discriminating
on the basis of national origin. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Tape
#309 (telephone no. 1-800-USA-EEOC; taped message as played Mar. 1988) (regarding relationship between Title VII and Immigration Reform & Control Act of
1986).
65. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391
(1982) (practices of trade associations and contractors did result in discriminatory
effect on operation of union hiring hall but since there was no intent to discriminate,
§ 1981 action could not be brought). The idea that Title VII proscribes practices
which are "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation," derives from Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). There the Supreme Court held that
Title VII requires the elimination of employment practices that, while neutral on
their face, adversely impact one race over another.
66. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; cf. LARSON, supra note 3,
§ 48.24, at 9A-117 (employer benefits from pre-investigative settlement by obviating
Commission finding of cause to believe employer discriminated and concomitant
stigma).
69. Compare supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text with supra notes 54-55.

1988]

PRIVATE CLUBS

mission.70 Further, unlike a Title VII plaintiff, a section 1981 plaintiff

may proceed against an employer who employs less than fifteen
persons. 7' In addition, because Title VII is an equitable remedy, a
jury is not available, whereas an action under section 1981 is, by
nature, legal and must be tried by a jury on demand. 72 Most importantly, while Title VII expressly exempts private clubs, section
1981 does not speak to the issue. In fact, two courts have concluded
that section 1981 is available to an employee alleging discrimination
73
on the part of a private club.

III.

The Private Club Exemption of Title VII

Title VII excludes from the definition of employer "a bona fide
private membership club (other than a labor organization) which is
exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of [tlitle 26. ' '74 Thus,
employers that fit this definition are exempt from the requirements
of Title VII. 75

70. The length of time a complainant has to file charges is set by statute:
A charge under this section shall be filed within [180] days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . except that in a case

of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person
aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a [s]tate or local agency
with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice . . . such charge

shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within [300] days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within [30]
days after receiving notice that the [s]tate or local agency has terminated
the proceedings under the [sitate or local law, whichever is earlier.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).
71. Title VII governs employers with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (1982). Section 1981 is silent as to the types of employers covered. See
supra note 12 for the text of § 1981.
72. See Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 934 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 826 (1983); O'Brien v. King World Prods., 669 F. Supp. 639, 642 (S.D.N.Y.

1987).
73. See Baptiste v. Cavendish Club, 670 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Guesby
v. Kennedy, 580 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Kan. 1984).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (1982). Organizations exempt from taxation under
§ 501(c) include those that are clearly not private membership clubs such as nonprofit
cemetery companies, professional football leagues, religious foundations and associations for the prevention of cruelty to animals. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1982).
Sections 501(c)(7) and (8) refer to the types of organizations one would expect to
be exempted. Section 501(c)(7) exempts "[c]lubs organized for pleasure, recreation
and other nonprofitable purposes, substantially all of the activities of which are
for such purposes and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder." Id. § 501(c)(7). Section 501(c)(8) exempts "[f]raternal
beneficiary societies, orders or associations

75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b)(2) (1982).

....

"

Id. § 501(c)(8).
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Title VII is not the only title of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (the
Act) to exempt private clubs. Such clubs are also exempt from the

requirements of title II (Title II),76 which guarantees equal access
to places of public accommodation." Under Title II, "a private club

or other establishment not in fact open to the public" is not con78
sidered a place of public accommodation.
Courts construing the Title VII exemption turn to Title II cases

for definitions of "private club" as well as for general precedential

value. 79 The distinction between the two, however, is important: Title
II applies where a complainant seeks membership in an organization
while Title VII applies where a complainant seeks employment.80
A.

Legislative History of the Title VII Exemption
The legislative history of Title VII does not address the Act's

exclusion of private clubs from within its scope. 8 In the absence
of such legislative history, one court has concluded that the exemption
was included to make it "possible, in this limited setting, for those

who wish to restrict the universe of their personal associates [as

76. Id. §§ 2000a-2000a-6.
77. Id. § 2000a.
78. Id. § 2000a(e).
79. See, e.g., Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, 535 F. Supp. 313 (W.D.N.C.
1982); Mills v. Fox, 421 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
80. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982) (Title II) with id. § 2000e (Title VII).
81. See LARSON, supra note 3, § 5.37(a), at 2-94; see also Fesel v. Masonic
Home of Del., 428 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D. Del. 1977), aff 'd without opinion, 591
F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). The debate over private clubs in both the House and
Senate focused on the Title II (public accommodations) exemption for private clubs
and fears that these clubs would be forced to admit anyone as members if, for
example, the clubs allowed members to bring in nonmembers for a meal. Industry
officials feared that by bringing in nonmembers for these limited purposes, the
clubs would become places of public accommodation. Senator Humphrey firmly
stressed that as long as the use of club facilities was limited to members and their
guests, the clubs would remain exempt from Title II. 110 CONG. REC. 6006-08,
9079-81 (1964).
Senators Humphrey and Smathers were conscious of their role in later interpretations of Title II's private club exemption. Senator Smathers was reading an
article critical of the exemption into the record when the two Senators had this
exchange: "Mr. Humphrey: Why does not the Senator finish the article and then
we will make some legislative history. Mr. Smathers: Yes, let us make some legislative
history. I am for it." Id. at 6007.
A newspaper article reprinted in the Congressional Record, critical of the Title
II exemption, expressed skepticism regarding the Title VII exemption: "[E]ven the
provisions [for private clubs] in this section [Title VII] of the proposed bill are
by no means clear." Lawrence, Private Clubs and Civil Rights, Wash. Evening
Star, Mar. 3, 1964, reprinted in 110 CONG. REC. 6636 (1964).
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fellow members of a private club] to also determine with whom
82
they would associate in their employer/employee relationships.
B.

Defining a Title V1I Private Membership Club
Only a handful of federal courts have interpreted the meaning of

a Title VII "private membership club." ' 83 The earliest decisions did
not focus on the "club" aspect of the definition. For example, one
court, finding that a hospital was both private and had members,
concluded that it was exempt from Title V1.84
Later decisions, cognizant of judicial interpretations of Title II's
"private club," ' 85 concluded that Title II and Title VII were meant
to cover the same organizations.8 6 For example, in Mills v.

82. Fesel, 428 F. Supp. at 577. An attorney with the legal unit of the New
York City branch of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission agreed with
this rationale for the exemption. He suggested, as an example of the exemption
at work, that the members of an all-women's club might choose to create an allwomen's environment by employing only women at the club. Telephone interview
with William Rodriguez, Staff Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Mar. 4, 1988). But for a discussion of a case holding that an all-men's
club did not have the right, under state law, to refuse employment to women, see
infra notes 162-71 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text; see also Annotation, "Employer" As Defined in Title VII, 69 A.L.R. FED. 191, § 10(c), at 229 (1984)
(discussing cases defining Title VII "private membership clubs"). Though not
mentioned in any of the federal court decisions discussed above, the Commission,
in a 1983 decision, delineated six factors to be considered in determining if an
organization is a bona fide private membership club: (1) status as a club in the
ordinary sense of the word; (2) requirements of meaningful conditions of limited
membership; (3) reservation of its facilities and services to members and their guests;
(4) control and ownership by the members; (5) operation for profit; and (6) use
of public advertisement to solicit members or promote use of facilities by the
general public. EEOC Decision No. 83-10, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1862,
1864 (1983). These factors roughly match those that have developed in the Title
II cases. See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
84. See Barrister v. Stineberg, 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
9806, at 845
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Mount Sinai Hospital held exempt as "private membership corporation" without explanation) (emphasis added). But see United States v. Medical
Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145, 152 (D.S.C. 1969) (Roper Hospital held to be employer
as it "ha[d] approximately 523 employees"). A hospital is clearly not a private
club; the court in Medical Society correctly concluded that because the hospital
employed more than the minimum number of employees (15), it was subject to
the requirements of Title VII.
85. See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
86. See Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., 428 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D. Del. 1977)
(holding that Title VII exemption was meant as companion to Title II exemption),
aff'd without opinion, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979); Mills v. Fox, 421 F. Supp.
519, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (because both definitions use the words "private" and
"club," Congress intended to exempt same organizations); see also EEOC Decision

630
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Fox,s7 the court stated that no case law specifically defined a Title
VII private club. 8s The court held that a nursing home providing
services to the elderly for a fee failed to meet any of the tests for
defining a private club set up by Title II cases. s9 Other courts
attempted to determine whether an organization was exempt by using
the criteria developed in the Title II cases 9° without identifying them
as such. 9' While some courts held that Title VII applies to a narrower
group of organizations than Title 11,92 others focused on the language
of Title VII which requires that an organization be tax-exempt.
Viewing tax-exemption as the most important feature, such courts
applied the private club exemption more broadly. 93
C.

Defining a Title II Private Membership Club

Courts generally consider eight factors in determining whether
an organization is a private club for Title II purposes. 94 "Each
factor should be considered and [may] either [tip] the balance for

or against [determining that an organization be given] private club
status."

95

Classified as membership practices, the first three factors

76-128 (Aug. 4, 1976) (WESTLAW, Database: FLB-EEOC) (in defining Title VII
private club it is helpful to examine body of law that has arisen under Title II);
LARSON, supra note 3, § 5.37(a), at 2-98 (when act uses same term in different
sections, courts should give similar meaning to both).
87. 421 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
88. Id.at 522.
89. Id. at 523. See supra note 83 for six factors the Commission has enumerated
for determining whether a club is private.

90. See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
91. See Guesby v. Kennedy, 580 F. Supp. 1280, 1282 (D. Kan. 1984) (noting
that candidate must apply, be screened and approved, that club does not advertise
and that dues must be paid, in holding that club was private for Title VII purposes).
92. See Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131-32 (5th
Cir. 1980) (Title VII exemption would apply to narrower group because Title II
does not use adjectives "bona fide" and "membership" to modify "private club").
93. See Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, 535 F. Supp. 313, 315 (W.D.N.C.
1982) (affidavit of president of club, its articles of incorporation and proof of its
status under § 501(c) are enough to qualify defendant as private club). But see
Quijano, 617 F.2d at 133 (tax exemption alone is insufficient to render organization
private membership club under Title VII); Ahmad v. Independent Order of Foresters,
81 F.R.D. 722, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (defendant, tax-exempt under § 501(c), must
also be bona fide private membership club; this determination requires evidentiary
hearing), aff'd without opinion, 707 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1983).
94. See Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182,
1203 (D. Conn. 1974).
95. See Durham v. Red Lake Fishing & Hunting Club, 666 F. Supp. 954, 95960 (W.D. Tex. 1987) (quoting Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1150
(S.D. Tex. 1970)).
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are the most important: 96 (1) how selective the club is in admitting
new members; 97 (2) whether there are formal membership procedures; 9 and (3) how much control there is over new members. 99
The remaining factors are: (4) to what extent club facilities are
used by nonmembers; °° (5) whether there are dues and how large
they are; 0 1 (6) whether the club was created or its structure changed
in order to avoid civil rights laws; 10 2 (7) whether the club advertises; 103 and (8) whether there is a profit motive in the club's dayto-day activities.

4

A recent district court case illustrates how a court might weigh
these factors. In Durham v. Red Lake Fishing & Hunting Club, 05
the plaintiff was denied membership in the defendant club. 3 6 Factors
96. See Durham, 666 F. Supp. at 960; United States v. Fraternal Order of
Eagles, 472 F. Supp. 1174, 1175-76 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
97. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973)
(when club is open to any white person and so only selective regarding race, club
is not truly selective); Wright v. Salisbury Club, 632 F.2d 309, 312 (4th Cir. 1980)
(only persons denied membership are black so club is not selective); Durham, 666
F. Supp. at 960 (in 50 years, club only rejected two white applicants so club is
not truly selective).
98. See Stout v. YMCA, 404 F.2d 687, 688 (5th Cir. 1968) (when 50 cents of
$1.50 room charge was "membership fee" and no membership application was
required, YMCA was not private club).
99. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 302 (1969) (amusement area is not truly

private when some 100,000 whites are allowed to visit each season).
100. See Durham, 666 F. Supp. at 960 (roads on club property paved and open
to public); Williams v. Rescue Fire Co., 254 F. Supp. 556, 563 (D. Md. 1966)
(pool was open to the general public-except blacks-prior to the 1964 Act); see
also 110 CONG. REc. 6008 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("if the club were
trying to make ends meet . . . and the board of directors decided that a substantial
section of the club's facilities should be open to the public . . . it thereby would

lose its special exemption").
101. See United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 378 (E.D. La. 1969) (fact
that club charges initiation fee and annual dues is point in its favor); Williams,
254 F. Supp. at 563 (25 cent annual membership fee is insignificant).
102. See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 379 (public restaurant attempted to become
whites-only restaurant club); see also 110 CONG. REc. 6008 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey) ("[ilf a club were established as a way of bypassing or avoiding the
effect of the [Title II exemption], and it was not really a club . .. then that kind
of club would come under the language of the bill").
103. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 n.10 (1976) (schools advertised
in Yellow Pages so therefore were appealing to any and all parents whose children
met their academic requirements, thus were not truly private) (Supreme Court is
reconsidering Runyon; see supra note 13); Wright v. Salisbury Club, 632 F.2d 309,
312 (4th Cir. 1980) (club solicits members through public advertising in local paper
so is not truly private).
104. See Wright, 632 F.2d at 313 (club serves commercial interests of developer
and so is not truly private).
105. 666 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Tex. 1987).
106. Id. at 956.
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in favor of finding the club private included: (1) that the club
collected dues; (2) that membership was limited to eighty persons;
and (3) that the club had a formal application procedure in which
any applicant who received five or more negative votes would be
rejected. 07 The Durham court, however, found that the club was
not truly selective because "[o]nly two white applicants [were] rejected
01 8
in the past fifty years, and they both had peculiar circumstances."'
Further, the court found that when the county opened the club's
roads to the public, the club lost its "private" status. 1°9

IV.

The Arguments For and Against the Implied Amendment
Theory

Courts that have considered whether a private club exempt from
employment discrimination suits under Title VII is also exempt under
section 1981 have issued conflicting decisions. These courts are divided on the issue of whether the Title VII exemption impliedly
amends and limits section 1981 so as to bar a section 1981 action
against a private club.
A.

Arguments For the Implied Amendment Theory

Courts presume that in enacting legislation Congress intended to
create a consistent body of law."10 Therefore, it is argued, Congress
would not amend an existing law without expressing its intent to
do so."' Nonetheless, the presence of an earlier law may create an
inconsistent body of law. In such an instance, courts may find an
2
implied amendment of the earlier law."1

107. Id.
108.. Id. at 960. The court explained these rejections in the following manner:
One had violated [c]lub policy as a guest by destroying club property
during target practice and by overstaying the guest period of [28] days
per year. The second was a leader of the Jehovah's Witness Church and
was in charge of racially integrating the local Jehovah's Witness Church.
Id.
109. Id.
110. IA J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.09, at 332 (4th ed.
1985) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND].
11. Id.; see also Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 471-72 (1982)
(Title VII did not impliedly repeal requirement that federal courts give full faith
and credit to state court judgments).

112.

1A

SUTHERLAND,

supra note 110, § 23.09, at 332.
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In holding that Title VII impliedly amends section 1981, courts
have applied three rules of statutory construction." 3 First, when
interpreting the reach of an earlier act's broad language, a court
may use a later act to determine the scope of that reach. 1 14 Section
1981 is silent as to what sorts of employers it encompasses." 5 Because
it does not exempt specific employers, section 1981, it is argued,
may apply to all employers. Therefore, some courts look for guidance
to Title VII"1 6 which, of course, exempts private clubs.' 7 Thus,
courts following that line of reasoning hold that a club exempt
under Title VII is also exempt under section 1981. s
The second rule of statutory construction employed by courts in
this context is that where "[tihe provisions of one statute specifically
focus on a particular problem [they] will always, in the absence of
express contrary legislative intent, be held to prevail over provisions
of a different statute more general in its coverage."" 9 The provisions
of Title VII specifically focus on private clubs 2 ° while the provisions
of section 1981 do not.' 2' There is no legislative history showing an
intent that private clubs, exempt under Title VII, should still be
liable under section 1981.122 Therefore, courts have held that the
specific provisions of Title VII prevail over the more general provisions of section 1981.121

113. See Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182,
1201-02 (D. Conn. 1974); see also Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, 535 F.
Supp. 313, 317 (W.D.N.C. 1982); Kemerer v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 256, 258 (E.D.
Mich. 1981).
114. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 388 U.S. 175, 194 (1966) (reach of
section of National Labor Relations Act should be determined by referring to recent
amendments to Act).
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). See supra note 12 for the text of § 1981.
116. See Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, 535 F. Supp. 313, 316 (W.D.N.C.
1982) ("a suit against a private club could not be brought under § 1981 when it
is specifically barred by Title VII").
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (1982); see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 116.
119. Cornelius, 382 F. Supp. at 1201 (quoting Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.
100, 124 (1904) and citing General Elec. Credit Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., 271
F. Supp. 699, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
550-51 (1974).
120. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 12.
122. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
123. See Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182,
1201 (D. Conn. 1974); Kemerer v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 256, 258 (E.D. Mich. 1981);
Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, 535 F. Supp. 313, 317 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
In addition to exempting private clubs, Title VII also exempts Indian tribes from
those employers who must comply with its provisions. Using the rule that the
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Finally, although the partial repeal or limiting of an earlier act
"by implication" is not favored as a means of statutory construction,
the legislative history of an act may serve as the basis for such a
25
result. 124 Specifically, when two acts are in "irreconcilable conflict"'1
and the legislative intent is clear,126 the later act may be viewed as
27
impliedly amending the earlier act.
On its face, section 1981 reaches employment discrimination without regard to whether an employer is a private club. 12 Thus, section
1981 would cover those private clubs otherwise not reachable because
of the Title VII exemption. 2 9 In essence, section 1981 says private
clubs may not discriminate while Title VII says they may. This is

specific provisions of a statute prevail over the more general provisions of another
statute, the Tenth Circuit has held that because § 1981 fails to prohibit specifically
preferential treatment of tribal members, the specific provisions of Title VII control,
and a plaintiff cannot sue an Indian tribe under § 1981 for racial discrimination
in employment. Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670, 673 (10th Cir. 1980);
accord Stroud v. Seminole Tribe, 606 F. Supp. 678, 680 (S.D. Fla. 1985). In
Wardle, the Ute Indian tribe fired a nonIndian policeman as part of a program
to place qualified tribal members in jobs paid for with .tribal funds. Wardle, 623
F.2d at 671. Wardle alleged he was fired solely because of his race and sued under
various federal civil rights provisions, but not under Title VII, presumably because
Title VII exempted Indians as employers. The court, however, did not allow him
to escape Title VII's exemption and affirmed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment to the Utes. For a discussion of the long history of allowing Indians to
prefer Indians in their hiring practices, see Morton, 417 U.S. at 541-45.
Title VII also exempts from the category of employees the personal staff of
certain public officials. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1982). In Ramirez v. San Mateo
County Dist. Attorney's Office, 639 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1981), the court treated
Title VII and § 1981 as separate remedies without discussion. The district court
found that the position of deputy district attorney fit the category of personal
staff, thus Ramirez could not bring his Title VII claims for discrimination based
on national origin. The district court, however, did allow Ramirez to bring his
§ 1981 suit. Id. at 515. It is possible that had Ramirez won his § 1981 suit,
discussion of the propriety of allowing § 1981 claims would have followed. For a
discussion of the personal staff exemption, see United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d
1114, 1116 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 143 (1988).
124. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976) (quoting
United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976)).
125. "Irreconcilable conflict" denotes a "positive repugnancy" between two statutes. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 155.
126. The legislative intent may establish a repeal by implication because it shows
the true purposes of the statute. Thus, it is always of great importance. IA
SUTHERLAND, supra note 110, § 23.09, at 332.
127. See Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 154-56.
128. See supra note 12.
129. See Kemerer v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 256, 258 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (quoting
Wright v. Salisbury Club, 479 F. Supp. 378, 386 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980)).
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the irreconcilable conflict between two acts that is required to meet
the first part of the test. 130
As to the second half of the test, the legislative history of Title
VII does not show an intent to limit or amend section 1981.11 The
second half of the test cannot be met. Two courts have held, however,
that Title VII does impliedly limit section 1981 .123These courts reason
that prior to Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., section 1981 applied
only to cases involving state action.'33 Because the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 became law four years prior to Jones, Congress, it is argued,
believed it was writing on a "clean slate.' 13 4 In other words, Congress-unaware of Jones-believed that there were no other federal
statutes governing racial discrimination in private employment.
The courts which have held that Title VII impliedly limited section
1981 reason that it is irrelevant that the legislative history of the
1964 Act does not indicate congressional intent to amend or limit
section 1981. That is, Congress could not possibly have indicated
13 6
such an intent.' Thus, these courts found that the test was met.
B.

Arguments Against the Implied Amendment Theory

In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,'3 7 the Supreme Court held
that the proper and timely filing of a Title VII complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission did not toll the running
of the statute of limitations for a section 1981 action.'38 The opinion
stressed the differences between Title VII and section 1981,19 observing that "[s]ection 1981 is not coextensive in its coverage with
14
Title VII. The latter is made inapplicable to certain employers."'

130. Id.
131. See Note, Is Section 1981 Modified By Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964?, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1223, 1228 n.36 ("Civil Rights Act of 1866 was never
mentioned in either the debates or committee hearings concerning Title VII")
[hereinafter Modified By Title VII].
132. See Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, 535 F. Supp. 313, 317 (W.D.N.C.
1982); Kemerer v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. Mich. 1981). Though these
cases quote language discussing repeal-by-implication, see, e.g., Kemerer, 520 F.
Supp. at 258, it is clear from their results that they are not claiming that Title
VII repealed § 1981, but rather amended or limited § 1981, see, e.g., Kemerer,
520 F. Supp. at 260.
133. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
134. See Hudson, 535 F. Supp. at 317; Kemerer, 520 F. Supp. at 259.
135. See supra note 134.
136. Id.

137. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
138. See id. at 462-66.
139. See id. at 457-61.
140. Id.at 460.
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In support, the Court cited section 2000e(b) of Title VII. Private
membership clubs are among those employers listed in section 2000e(b).
Two courts have subsequently interpreted the Supreme Court's
language in Johnson as logically implying that section 1981 then
applies to all employers, including those "certain employers" to
which Title VII does not apply-namely, private clubs. 14'
Because Johnson did not decide or even interpret the private club
exemption, the language quoted above is dictum. 42 Courts have
inferred, however, from the opinion as a whole that Title VII and
section 1981 should be viewed as separate and distinct remedies. 43
As such, courts note that section 1981 has not been impliedly
amended by such Title VII provisions as Title VII's strict time
limitation,'" its limited remedies 45 or its requirement that the administrative remedies be exhausted prior to the filing of a civil
action.'46 Further, a complainant need not proceed under Title VII
before suing under section 1981.147 In short, it is argued that "the
scope of protection of Title VII and [s]ection 1981 differ both in
terms of relief and the ability to bring the claim."' 141 Courts which
have held that Title VII does not impliedly amend section 1981
reason that if these varied Title VII provisions do not amend section
1981, the private club exemption does not amend it either.' 49

141. Baptiste v. Cavendish Club, 670 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Guesby
v. Kennedy, 580 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 (D. Kan. 1984).
142. "Dictum" is defined as a "remark made by a judge ... not necessarily
involved in the case or essential to its determination . . . [which] lack[s] the force
of an adjudication." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 409 (5th ed. 1979).
143. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 457-61 (1975); see
also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974) ("legislative history
of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue
independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal
statutes"); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Title
VII and [§] 1981 are overlapping but independent remedies for racial discrimination
in employment"), modified on other grounds, 784 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1986). But
see New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 n.24 (1979)
("[a]lthough the exact applicability of [§ 1981 to a claim that a statute had an
adverse impact on blacks and Hispanics] has not been decided by this Court, it
seems clear that [§ 1981] affords no greater substantive protection than Title VII").
144. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
147. See Torre v. Barry, 661 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Long v. Ford
Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1974). The situation for federal employees
is different. Title VII is their exclusive remedy for claims of discrimination. See
Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976).
148. Baptiste v. Cavendish Club, 670 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
149. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). But see

19881

PRIVATE CLUBS

. Implicit in the argument that Congress believed it was writing on
a clean slate when it wrote Title VII is the assumption that had
Congress known of the conflict between section 1981 and Title VII,
they would have amended or otherwise limited section 1981.150 One
commentator has suggested that the proper inquiry is not whether
Congress would have repealed or limited section 1981 but rather
whether and in what form Congress would have enacted Title VII.'5 '
This commentator has concluded that Title VII might have been
passed as a supplement to section 1981, but that given the political
climate of the early 1960's,112 sufficient votes to repeal or otherwise
limit section 1981 could not have been gathered.'5 3
When amending Title VII in 1972 and 1978,154 Congress did know
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1981 in Jones.'5 5
Congress could have added language limiting section 1981 or amending it directly, but chose not to do so. In fact, Congress specifically
rejected an amendment that would have made Title VII and the
6
Equal Pay Act the only federal laws on employment discrimination.1

Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1201 (D.
Conn. 1974) (differentiating between administrative procedures that have not been
incorporated into § 1981 and more substantive provisions, such as the private club
exemption, similarly not incorporated).
150. See Kemerer v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 256, 258-59 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
151. See Modified By Title VII, supra note 131, at 1234-35.
152. The seriousness of the racial discrimination problem had caught the attention
of the American public by the early 1960's. Throughout this time, there were
numerous boycotts, sit-ins and demonstrations. On May 2, 1963, Martin Luther
King staged a protest involving over 1,000 Alabama school children. The nation
watched their televisions in horror as the Birmingham police attacked the children
with billy clubs, police dogs and fire hoses. On August 28, 1963, approximately
200,000 people marched on Washington, D.C., to demand action from President
Kennedy and Congress. See, e.g., C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE
xvi-xix, 24-25 (1985).
.153. See Modified By Title VII, supra note 131, at 1235.
154. See supra note 4.
155. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. was decided in 1968 and the amendmentd
were made in 1972 and 1978.
156. 118 CONG. REc. 3371-73 (1972). Senator Williams stated his opposition to
amendment of § 1981:'
The rights of individuals to bring suits in [flederal courts to redress
individual acts of discrimination, including employment discrimination,
(were] first provided by the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, 42
U.S.C. [§§] 1981, 1983 ....
[T]he courts have specifically held that Title
VII and [t]he Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 are not mutually
exclusive, and must be read together to provide alternative means to
redress individual grievances. Mr. President, the amendment of the Senator
from Nebraska will repeal the first major piece of civil rights legislation
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Title VII Does Not Amend Section 1981

Arguments other than those based on statutory construction may
determine whether Title VII amends section 1981 so as to bar a
private club employee from bringing an employment discrimination
suit. Other considerations include the effect of the constitutional
right to freedom of association, the existence of pertinent legislative
history and basic principles of equal opportunity.
A.

The Title II Cases Apply to Membership-Not Employment

Courts holding that Title VII impliedly amends section 1981111
primarily rely on a line of Title II cases holding that a section 1981

plaintiff does not have a cause of action against a private club that
denies him membership. 1 8 That linc of cases can be distinguished
from the Title VII cases in two ways: (1) the constitutional right

to freedom of association does not extend to the employer/employee
relationship; 5 9 and (2) the legislative history focuses only on the
Title II exemption.l 6°

in this nation's history.
118 CONG. REc. 3371. The proposed amendment making Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act the only federal laws on employment discrimination failed. Id.
at 3373.
Congress again contemplated the relationship between Title VII and § 1981 when
passing the Attorney's Fees Award Act in 1976. Congress chose to give to § 1981
plaintiffs what Title VII plaintiffs already had-the remedy of attorney's fees. See
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); White v. Beal, 447 F. Supp. 788, 792-93 (D.C. Pa. 1978)
(prevailing litigant may recover fees under both Title VII and § 1981).
157. See Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, 535 F. Supp. 313, 317 (W.D.N.C.
1982); Kemerer v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
158. Kemerer cites six cases: (1) Wright v. Salisbury Club, 479 F. Supp. 378,
385-87 (E.D. Va. 1979) (private clubs exempt under Title II necessarily exempt
under § 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980); (2) Perkins
v. New Orleans Athletic Club, 429 F. Supp. 661, 665-66 (E.D. La. 1976) (without
discussing Title II, court held that § 1981 does not reach intimate associational
relationships and does not compel defendant club to admit plaintiff as member);
(3) Cornelius v. Benevolent Protection Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203
(D. Conn. 1974) ("[§] 1981 does not apply to the membership 'contracts' of truly
private clubs"); (4) Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D.
Fla. 1973) (when club is private, plaintiffs must show state action for standing to
sue); (5) Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 343 F. Supp.
112, 113-14 (D. Mass. 1972) (court notes lack of authority for § 1981 grounds to
obtain membership in private club); and (6) Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational
Ass'n, 451 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (4th Cir. 1971) (private clubs exempt under Title
II necessarily exempt under § 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
See Kemerer, 520 F. Supp. at 258. Hudson cites three cases: Tillman, Wright and
Cornelius. See Hudson, 535 F. Supp. at 316-17.
159. See infra notes 161-74 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
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1. Freedom of Association and Private Club Employees
The constitutional right to freedom of association does not protect
clubs that discriminate in the selection of employees.' 61 The Supreme
Court has recently decided not to review Bohemian Club v. Fair
Employment & Housing Commission.162 In that case, the California
Court of Appeal held that club members' first amendment right to
freedom of association did not protect them from governmental
intrusion into their selection of club employees. 163 The club excluded
women from most of approximately 100 permanent positions and
all of approximately 250 temporary positions.164 The court of appeal
ordered that the state Fair Employment and Housing Commission's
findings be reinstated.' 6 These findings required the club to institute
an affirmative action program to employ women. 66
Bohemian Club outlines two types of associational rights protected
by the Constitution: "intimate" and "expressive." 167 An individual's
intimate associational rights prevent intrusion into their ability to
"enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships,"
while their expressive associational rights involve "the right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by
the [f]irst [a]mendment," for example, freedom of speech or assembly. 168 Bohemian Club holds that while relationships between club
members may be intimate, and thus constitutionally protected, re161. See infra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
162. 187"Cal. App. 3d 1, 231 Cal. Rptr. 769, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 51 (1987).
163. Id. at 13-14, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
164. Id. at 7-8, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
165. Id. at 24, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
166. Id. at 6, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
167. Id. at 12, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 775 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)). Although Bohemian Club involves a state antidiscrimination statute rather than a federal provision and sex discrimination rather than
race discrimination, its holding on associational rights rests on Supreme Court
precedent.
The constitutional source of expressive associational rights is the first amendment.
Justice Brennan wrote that "implicit in the right to engage in activities protected
by the [flirst [a]mendment [is] a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious and
cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
Justice Brennan found the source of intimate associational rights in the general
constitutional protection of "highly personal relationships [which merit] a substantial
measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the [sitate." Id. at 618.
"Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore
safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any
concept of liberty." Id. at 619.
168. Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm 'n, 187 Cal. App.
3d 1, 12, 231 Cal. Rptr. 769, 775, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 51 (1987).

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. XVI

lationships between members and employees are not. 169 In so holding,
the court noted that the club's hiring procedure was not selective

and that employees were not allowed to fraternize with club
members. 170 The club apparently did not claim that their expressive
7
associational rights were threatened.1 '
A club member's right to freedom of association prevents that

member from being forced to associate intimately with those with
whom he would rather not associate.

72

Such reasoning can be jus-

169. Id. at 13-14, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
170. Id. at 13, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
171. Id. at 14 n.7, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 776 n.7.
172. See EEOC Decision No. 85-2, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1893, 1895
(1984) (clubs may exclude those "individuals with whom they would not want to
associate on a personal basis") (emphasis added).
Whether the law should permit private clubs to discriminate in membership is
a hotly debated topic. In 1982, the American Bar Association House of Delegates
adopted a resolution to reclassify private clubs as public accommodations for Title
II purposes if they derived a substantial (over 20%) portion of their income from
business sources. In an unusual move, the body later reversed this recommendation.
Proponents of the resolution reasoned that discrimination should not be supported
by tax subsidies. Members of truly personal and social clubs should not receive a
business tax deduction for their memberships. On the other hand, when members
of a substantially business-oriented club are able to take advantage of the tax laws,
the club ought to comply with nondiscrimination laws. Opponents of the amendment
pointed primarily to the adverse effect on the rights to free speech, privacy and
association. They also expressed concern about the public examination of the
members' and club's tax returns-presumably to see if someone was taking their
dues as a deduction. None of the three articles discussing the issue mentioned the
Title VII exemption. Born, The A.B.A. Should Continue to Oppose Discrimination
by Business Clubs, 68 A.B.A. J. 1024 (1982); Ruddy, A Protest from Private
Organizations, 68 A.B.A. J. 884 (1982); Winter, Club Bias Proposal Reversed by
House, 68 A.B.A. J. 1204 (1982).
On June 20, 1988, the Supreme Court affirmed New York State Club Ass'n v.
City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988), aff'g, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d
915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987). The New York Court of Appeals had held that the
city's interest in eliminating discrimination against women and minorities justified
infringement on club members' first amendment rights to free speech and association.
A New York City ordinance states that a club is not "private" for purposes of
the public accommodation statute if .the club: (1) has more than 400 members; (2)
provides regular meal service; and (3) receives payment directly or indirectly from
or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or business. NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102[9] (1986). The National Club Association considers
New York State Club Ass'n the most significant case that the Supreme Court has
ever adjudicated concerning private clubs and the rights of their members. Turning
the Tide, PERSPECTIVE, Feb. 1988, at 6. Several cities, including Buffalo, Washington,
D.C., Los Angeles and San Francisco, have laws similar to New York City's. Id.;
see also All-Male Clubs Give Ground, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1988, at 42, col. 6
(discussing Boston's regulation denying liquor licenses to clubs that discriminate in
their membership).
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tified as the protection of associational rights.' 73 When the rela-

tionship being examined is between club members and employees of
their club, however, these rights must give way and members can
not constitutionally justify excluding employees on discriminatory
174
grounds.
2.

The Legislative History Does Not Focus on Title VII

The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 focuses
only on the Title II exemption.'75 Thus, it is not clear what Congress
intended by exempting private clubs under Title VII. 176 Those in
Congress who were critical of the Title II private club exemption
worried about the possible impact on membership practices. 177 Critics
of the language of the exemption did not fear that club members
would be forced to associate with employees they would otherwise
17
choose not to associate with.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),' 179 enacted
three years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was modeled after

Title VII, yet does not exempt private clubs from its prohibitions

against discrimination on the basis of age in employment.8 0 One
commentator has noted that it follows that "private club associational
rights are not, in the mind of Congress, paramount, constitutionally,
to Congress'.

.

. authority to regulate the privilege of employment

through antidiscrimination statutes."181
173. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
("[it is the constitutional right of every person to close his home or club to any
person").
174. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 n.4 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (enforcement of antidiscrimination laws may, as side effect, infringe
constitutional right of freedom of association); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455, 470 (1973) ("[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form
of exercising freedom of association protected by the [f]irst [a]mendment, but it
has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections").
175. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra note 83.
179. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
180. Id. § 630(b). The statute defines "employer" as any person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who employs 20 or more persons. Id.; see Kauffman
v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 346 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982) (same basic standards
apply to claims under both Title VII and ADEA); Murphy v. American Motors
Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (ADEA and Title VII may
"profitably be compared").
181. Garcia, Title VII Does Not Preempt State Regulation of Private Club
Employment Practices, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1107, 1116 (1983) [hereinafter Garcia].
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The "Badges and Incidents" Argument

The Enabling Clause of the thirteenth amendment 82 gave Congress
the power "to enact all necessary and proper laws for the obliteration
and prevention of slavery with all its badges and incidents."'8 3 In
his concurring opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,114 Justice
Douglas listed badges of slavery that still remained.8 5 He included
among them, real estate agents using subterfuge to avoid selling to
blacks, labor unions barring the entrance of blacks, and schools
86
moving much too slowly to integrate.1
Each of these badges listed by Justice Douglas has a competing
interest-the right of a community to determine who their neighbors
will be, 8 7 of workers to determine with whom they share the benefits
of their association, 8 8 of parents to determine the type of schooling
their children receive. 8 9 But each of these competing interests is
inferior to the state's interest in creating equal opportunities for all
its citizens. 190

182. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. See supra note 49 for the text of the
thirteenth amendment.
183. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883). Justice Bradley reasoned,
however, that "slavery" was the operative word and that the refusal to allow a
black person to stay at an inn or enter a theater had nothing to do with involuntary
servitude. Id. Justice Harlan, as indicated in his dissent, would have found such
discrimination to be a badge of servitude. Id. at 40-42 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
184. 392 U.S. 409, 444 (1968).
185. Id. at 447-49.

186. Id.; see Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 149-50 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (erection of the physical barrier between historically all-white residential
neighborhood and predominantly black neighborhood is "precisely the kind of
injury that [§ 1982] was enacted to prevent"). But see Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 211 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (some racially motivated refusals to
contract, such as the decision "to hire a Negro or a white babysitter or to admit
a Negro or a white to a private association" cannot be considered badges or
incidents of slavery).
187. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412-13 (1968) (plaintiff
cannot be prevented from buying home in white community solely on basis of
race).
188. See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945) (association
whose membership was limited to whites and Indians argued unsuccessfully that
state civil rights law interfered with both its right to select its own membership
and its property rights).
189. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) ("parents have a [f]irst
[a]mendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote
the belief that racial discrimination is desirable" but such schools do not have
right to exclude blacks).
190. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 n.4 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (female plaintiff denied partnership in law firm states cause of action
for Title VII discrimination). Justice Powell noted the tradeoff, stating that "en-
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The right of private clubs to discriminate between employees based
on their race is also such a badge. This is because it "detracts from
the basic principle that racial discrimination in employment is
wrong."' 9' It implies that of the two competing interests, the right
of club members to discriminate in their choice of employees is
more important than the right of individuals to pursue employment
with private clubs, confident that they are being judged only on
their qualifications.
VI.

Recommendation

In title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), Congress
formally recognized the right of individuals to take action to redress
acts of employment discrimination.1 92 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has held that individuals discriminated against in employment on
the basis of race may sue under section 1981 as well as Title VII. 193
In various civil rights enactments, Congress has recognized that the
more means of enforcing equal employment laws exist, the more
likely it is that employment discrimination will be discouraged. 94
Nonetheless, within the context of private clubs, courts that have
addressed the issue are divided as to whether Title VII and section
1981 are both available to the plaintiff alleging employment discrimination. 95 The dispute centers on whether Title VII impliedly amends

forcement of laws that ban discrimination [may be at a] cost to other values,
including constitutional rights. Such laws may impede the exercise of personal
judgment in choosing one's associates or colleagues." Id. (Powell, J., concurring);
see also Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1963) ("there is hardly any
private enterprise that does not feel the pinch of some public regulation from price
control, to health and fire inspection, to zoning, to safety measures, to minimum
wages and working conditions, to unemployment insurance").
191.

M.

SOVERN,

LEGAL RESTRAINTS

ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

IN EMPLOYMENT

67 (1966).
192. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
193. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975)
(plaintiff claiming employment discrimination may look to both Title VII and
§ 1981 for relief).
194. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 48. "[Tlhe legislative history of Title VII manifests
a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights
under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes." Id. (emphasis
added); see also 118 CONG. REc. 3369-70 (1972) (Congress should not diminish
"the variety of enforcement means available to deal with discrimination in employment").
195. See, e.g., Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985)
("Title VII and [§] 1981 are overlapping but independent remedies"), modified on
other grounds, 784 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1986); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459
F.2d 621, 623-24 (8th Cir. 1972) (same).
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section 1981. Congress has had numerous opportunities to expressly
amend or repeal section 1981 but has not done so.196 The argument
that Title VII's private club exemption impliedly amended section 1981
does not acknowledge congressional intent. 97 Further, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that section 1981 is an independent remedy
and has not been impliedly amended by Title VII's other requirements. 9s Thus, to find that the Title VII private club exemption
amends section 1981 ignores the Supreme Court's reasoning.' 99
This Note maintains that three arguments support the conclusion
that Congress should repeal that part of Title VII which exempts
private clubs. First, while the constitutional right to freedom of
association may protect relationships between club members, it does
not apply to the employer/employee relationship . 2 ° Second, granting
private clubs the right to discriminate between employees based on
their race is a badge of slavery.20° And finally, Congress' exclusion
of private clubs from Title VII is not traceable to any legislative
history. Nor has Congress included a private club exemption in other
civil rights legislation. 20 2 In short, the exemption is an anomaly.
VII.

Conclusion

Private clubs occupy a privileged position in society insofar as
they may exclude from membership those with whom their members
choose not to associate. This privilege should not extend to employment discrimination against those who are otherwise protected
by discrimination laws. A club member may have a right to employ
discriminatory grounds when determining with whom he shall drink.
The same rights are not involved, however, when that club member
uses discriminatory grounds to determine who may bring him his
drinks. The repeal of the private club exemption of Title VII would
clearly establish that any and all employment discrimination will be
punished. In a society that has made it clear through law and policy

196. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
197. See Baptiste v. Cavendish Club, 670 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Guesby v. Kennedy, 580 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 (D. Kan. 1984).
198. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459-60.
199. See Guesby, 580 F. Supp. at 1285; Garcia, supra note 181, at 1127.
200. See supra notes 161-74 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text. Title VII also proscribes
gender and religious discrimination. Discrimination against these groups also constitutes a "badge." Such discrimination reflects the belief that members of a
particular group are superior to other persons.
202. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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that discrimination in so many areas is illegal, the private club
exemption is an archaic remnant of the past.
Until Congress repeals the Title VII private club exemption, however,
section 1981 can protect those plaintiffs who allege a private club has
discriminated against them in employment on the basis of race.
Elyse Hilton

